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DPI vs TVPI vs MOIC: An LP Guide to Private Markets Performance Metrics in 2026

Net IRR alone hides more than it reveals. Here is how institutional LPs combine DPI, TVPI, MOIC, RVPI, and PME to read a manager honestly, benchmark across vintages, and avoid the most common reporting traps.

Matthew S. · Allocator Desk · June 2026 · 10 min read

Net IRR is the number every GP leads with. It is also the number most likely to mislead an LP committee. A 22 percent net IRR on a fund that has returned 15 percent of paid-in capital after eight years is not the same story as a 22 percent net IRR on a fund that has returned 180 percent. The headline is identical. The economics are not.

This is why institutional allocators almost never look at a single performance metric in isolation. They read a stack: DPI, TVPI, MOIC, RVPI, and a public-market equivalent. Each one answers a different question, and the gaps between them are where the real diligence happens.

This guide walks through how LPs actually use these metrics in 2026, what each one hides, how to benchmark them against vintages and public markets, and the reporting traps that show up most often in quarterly letters.

The five numbers that matter, and what each one is for

Before getting into how to combine them, it helps to be precise about what each metric is actually measuring. The terminology has drifted enough across managers that you cannot assume two GPs are computing the same thing.

DPI (Distributions to Paid-In Capital) measures realized cash. It is the sum of all distributions the fund has paid back to LPs, divided by total paid-in capital. A DPI of 0.6x means the fund has returned 60 cents on the dollar in actual cash. DPI is the only metric on this list that cannot be marked up or down by a GP. It is either in your account or it is not.

RVPI (Residual Value to Paid-In Capital) measures unrealized value. It is the GP's fair-value mark on the remaining portfolio, divided by paid-in capital. A 1.4x RVPI means the GP believes the unrealized book is worth 1.4 times what LPs have funded. This is the soft number. It depends entirely on how the manager values private positions, what comparable multiples they use, and how aggressively they recognize markups in volatile quarters.

TVPI (Total Value to Paid-In Capital) is DPI plus RVPI. It is the full picture of what the fund has paid out plus what it claims is still in the ground. A 2.0x TVPI on a fund that is 0.4x DPI and 1.6x RVPI is a fundamentally different risk profile than a 2.0x TVPI that is 1.5x DPI and 0.5x RVPI, even though the headline multiple is the same.

MOIC (Multiple on Invested Capital) is a deal-level metric that gets misused at the fund level. Strictly, MOIC is total value (realized plus unrealized) divided by invested capital, not paid-in capital. The difference matters: invested capital excludes fees, expenses, and recycled capital. A fund-level "MOIC" reported by a GP is often closer to gross TVPI before fees. When you see MOIC in a quarterly letter, always check the footnote for what is in the denominator.

IRR (Internal Rate of Return) is the time-weighted return that solves for zero net present value across the fund's cash flows. Net IRR is after fees, carry, and expenses. IRR is sensitive to the timing of capital calls and distributions in ways that multiples are not, which is what makes it both useful and easy to game.

Why no single metric is enough

Each metric has a structural blind spot. The reason allocators read them as a stack is that the blind spots cancel out when you triangulate.

IRR ignores duration of capital deployment. A fund that calls 20 percent of commitments and exits a single deal in 18 months can post a stunning IRR on a tiny slice of the portfolio. The same fund three years later, with the rest of the capital deployed and most of it still unrealized, may show a much lower IRR even if the underlying portfolio is performing in line with expectations. IRR also rewards subscription line usage, which delays the start of the LP capital clock and inflates early-period returns without changing absolute dollars.

TVPI ignores time entirely. A 2.0x TVPI in year four is excellent. A 2.0x TVPI in year twelve is mediocre. The multiple is the same; the annualized return on LP capital is wildly different.

DPI ignores everything that is not yet realized. Early in a fund's life, DPI is a near-useless number. Late in a fund's life, it is the only number that matters, because RVPI represents stranded value that may or may not ever be monetized.

RVPI is the most subjective number on the page. It can move 15 to 20 percent quarter over quarter on the same underlying companies based on how the GP marks comparable trading multiples or applies illiquidity discounts. RVPI by itself is closer to a forecast than a fact.

MOIC, when used at the fund level, is often gross-of-fees and inconsistent across managers. It is most useful as a deal-level diagnostic on top performers and write-offs, not as a fund headline.

The institutional move is to never ask "what is the return?" without also asking "what fraction is realized, what is the vintage, and how does it compare to a public-market alternative?"

The DPI to TVPI ratio: the single most useful read

If you have to look at one composite metric, look at DPI divided by TVPI. This tells you what fraction of the fund's claimed value is already in LP bank accounts versus still depending on the GP's marks and future exits.

A few rough benchmarks for buyout funds:

  • **Vintage 0 to 3 years.** DPI / TVPI under 0.10 is normal. Almost nothing is realized.
  • **Vintage 4 to 6 years.** DPI / TVPI between 0.20 and 0.50 is healthy. Distributions should be ramping.
  • **Vintage 7 to 9 years.** DPI / TVPI between 0.60 and 0.85 indicates the fund is harvesting on schedule. Below 0.40 at this stage is a warning sign that the GP is sitting on too much unrealized book, often because the exit environment has not cooperated or because they are holding for higher marks.
  • **Vintage 10 plus.** DPI / TVPI should be approaching 1.0. Anything materially below means stranded NAV, and the question becomes whether the manager is a candidate for a continuation vehicle or a secondary sale.

In 2024 and 2025, distribution activity across private equity slowed sharply. Many otherwise strong funds are now sitting at 0.30 to 0.45 DPI / TVPI in years six through eight, where historical averages would be closer to 0.55. That is not necessarily a manager-level red flag, but it does mean LPs need to push harder on the realization plan and the assumptions behind held marks.

Benchmarking against vintage, not against the calendar

Comparing a 2018 vintage fund to a 2022 vintage fund on absolute TVPI or DPI tells you nothing useful. The 2022 fund has barely deployed. The 2018 fund has had four extra years of value creation and at least some realization.

Institutional benchmarking uses vintage cohorts. The most common reference sets are:

  • Cambridge Associates private equity and venture benchmarks
  • Burgiss / MSCI private capital benchmarks
  • Preqin quartile data
  • StepStone or other fund-of-funds proprietary databases

For each metric (IRR, TVPI, DPI), you compare your fund's number to the top quartile, median, and bottom quartile of funds in the same vintage and strategy. A fund at 1.8x TVPI in the 2017 vintage may be top quartile in buyout but bottom quartile in venture. The strategy slice matters as much as the year.

A practical workflow for an LP team: maintain a single quarterly worksheet per manager that tracks DPI, TVPI, IRR, DPI / TVPI ratio, and the percentile rank for each of those numbers within the relevant Cambridge or Burgiss cohort. The percentile movement quarter over quarter is often more informative than the absolute marks, because it controls for market-wide rerating.

Public Market Equivalent: the metric that prevents self-deception

Multiples and IRRs tell you how the fund did. They do not tell you whether the fund did better than you could have done by buying the equivalent slice of public markets with the same timing of cash flows.

Public Market Equivalent (PME) methods solve this. The most common are:

  • **Kaplan-Schoar PME (KS-PME).** Computes the ratio of the fund's distributions plus residual value, each scaled by the corresponding public index return, divided by paid-in capital scaled the same way. A KS-PME above 1.0 means the fund outperformed the index on the same cash-flow schedule.
  • **Direct Alpha.** Annualizes the outperformance versus the public index in IRR terms. A direct alpha of 3 percent means the fund beat the index by 300 basis points per year on the LP cash flows.
  • **PME+.** Adjusts the public index proceeds so that fund and index have identical terminal values, then back-solves for the implied scaling. Useful for vintage comparisons across managers.

For private equity, the S&P 500 or Russell 3000 are the standard reference indices. For venture, the NASDAQ Composite or a venture-weighted public index is more appropriate. For infrastructure or real estate, the relevant listed real-asset index applies.

The PME question is the one that exposes the strongest funds. A buyout fund that posts a 16 percent net IRR sounds good. If the S&P returned 14 percent with the same cash-flow timing, the manager produced 200 basis points of excess return for taking on illiquidity, leverage, and concentration. Whether that is enough compensation is a decision your committee makes. But without the PME, you are not actually answering the question that matters.

Reporting traps to scan for every quarter

A few things to watch for when reading quarterly letters and capital account statements. These are not rare. They show up in funds from highly reputable managers.

Subscription line distortion of IRR. Sub-line usage delays the call on LP capital and inflates early-period IRR. Some managers now report both a "with sub-line" and "as if all capital was called day one" IRR. If only one is shown, ask for the other. The gap can be 300 to 600 basis points in early years.

Selective marking of comparables. RVPI can be inflated by choosing high-multiple public comparables for held companies. Look at how marks moved relative to the comparable basket the GP discloses. A flat or rising mark when the relevant public comparables fell 25 percent deserves a follow-up question.

Recycled capital not netted from MOIC. Some managers report MOIC on an "invested capital" basis that double counts distributions reinvested as new investments. Always check the footnote.

"Gross" metrics in body, "net" in footnote. Particularly common with MOIC and IRR in pitch decks. Body text uses the more flattering gross figure. The net figure, after fees, expenses, and carry, is in small type below.

Vintage drift via warehouse deals. When a fund warehouses deals before the official first close, the effective vintage of those investments can be a year or more earlier than the reported fund vintage. This matters for benchmarking.

Currency conversion. For funds with significant non-USD exposure, FX movements can drive 5 to 10 percent of period-over-period TVPI change. Look for managers who report local-currency and reporting-currency multiples side by side.

A practical institutional read in five lines

When an LP team sits down with a quarterly statement, the five-line read looks something like this:

1. DPI and TVPI versus last quarter, and the DPI / TVPI ratio. 2. Net IRR with and without sub-line, and direction since last quarter. 3. Top three contributors to RVPI change, and whether the marks moved with or against public comparables. 4. Distribution activity year-to-date versus the manager's pacing model. 5. Percentile rank versus the Cambridge or Burgiss cohort for vintage and strategy.

If any of those five lines moves materially in a direction the manager has not explained in writing, that is the next call to schedule.

Where this fits in the LP workflow

In a portfolio of 30 to 60 fund commitments, no team can do this depth of analysis quarter after quarter without a system of record. The point of tracking DPI, TVPI, RVPI, and PME in a structured way is not the metrics themselves. It is so that pattern changes surface automatically, the quarterly review with the CIO is grounded in the same numbers across managers, and the institutional memory of why a mark moved persists past the analyst who first wrote it down.

The managers who consistently end up in LP top quartiles tend to be the ones who report against this full stack voluntarily. The ones who lead with a single number, year after year, are the ones to read most carefully.

Topics

  • DPI
  • TVPI
  • MOIC
  • IRR
  • PME
  • LP Reporting
  • Private Equity
  • Performance